DoJ’s $13 Million ILC Dover Settlement Never Needed a Breach 

The Department of Justice settled a cybersecurity False Claims Act case on November 3, and nothing in the allegations required a breach. Every allegation was a contract requirement that was not met. 

The DoJ release names ILC Dover LP and ILC Astrospace LLC of Frederica, Delaware, which agreed to pay $13 million. It describes claims submitted from January 2018 to October 2024 under contracts and subcontracts with the Department of the Army, the Missile Defense Agency, and NASA. The release states the claims are allegations only, and that there has been no determination of liability. 

It arrived 16 weeks after the Department of War suspended CMMC Phase II. None of it depended on CMMC. Every requirement in the case was already in the contracts through DFARS 252.204-7012 and DFARS 252.204-7019. 

What follows reads each allegation against the clause behind it, then against the Microsoft environments most defense suppliers run. It ends with a self-check built from the same five allegations. 

DoJ Alleged Five Failures, Each With Its Own Dates 

The release lists five categories, and the periods are not the same. That detail matters, because it shows DoJ tracking each obligation separately rather than treating cybersecurity as one pass-or-fail item. 

What DoJ allegedPeriod in the releaseWhere the requirement lives
CUI stored with a third party without ensuring security equivalent to the FedRAMP Moderate baseline, plus DoD requirements for incident reporting, malware, media preservation, forensic access, and damage assessmentFeb 2023 to Oct 2024DFARS 252.204-7012(b)(2)(ii)(D)
No system security plan developed, documented, and periodically updated for each covered information systemJan 2018 to Mar 2022, and Sep 2022 to Oct 2024NIST SP 800-171 3.12.4, through DFARS 252.204-7012
Not all controls in NIST SP 800-171 and 800-53 fully implemented, including controls whose absence could lead to network exploitation or data exfiltrationJan 2018 to Oct 2024DFARS 252.204-7012 and the contracts’ own terms
No plans of action developed and implemented to correct deficiencies and reduce vulnerabilitiesJan 2018 to May 2019, and Jan 2022 to Sep 2024NIST SP 800-171 3.12.2
No current NIST SP 800-171 assessment submitted to DoD (ILC Astrospace); no current assessment based on the SSP and the DoD Assessment Methodology (ILC Dover)Nov 2020 to Oct 2024DFARS 252.204-7019

Read the SSP and POA&M rows again. Both have a gap in the middle, which means a plan existed for part of the period and then fell out of date. The obligation has no expiry date, so a plan that stops being maintained is treated the same as no plan at all.  

The assessment row starts in November 2020, the month the DFARS 252.204-7019 assessment requirement took effect.

The Case Did Not Need a Breach 

The release does not describe an incident, a stolen file, or an attacker. It describes controls not implemented, plans not written, and assessments not submitted. 

That is the shape of every cyber False Claims Act case DoJ has announced since the pause. Honeywell Aerospace settled on September 1 for more than $2 million over one network that did not meet NIST SP 800-171. LOGZONE settled in June for $507,144 after a DCMA assessment scored its implementation at -170 on a scale that runs from -203 to 110. 

The theory in each is the same. A contractor that bills under a contract containing 7012 represents that it meets 7012. When it does not, the claims are the exposure, whether or not anyone ever got in. 

The U.S. Attorney for the District of Delaware put it plainly in the ILC release: “The best response to cyberattacks is to prevent them from happening in the first place.” 

Each Allegation Maps to a Clause Already in Your Contracts 

The Cloud Requirement Covers Every Service Holding CUI 

DFARS 252.204-7012 requires that any cloud service storing, processing, or transmitting covered defense information meet security equivalent to the FedRAMP Moderate baseline, and that it meet the clause’s requirements for incident reporting, malicious software, media preservation, forensic access, and damage assessment. The DoW CIO CMMC FAQ confirms it applies to every cloud service provider handling CUI (E-A1), and that encrypting the data first does not change the answer (E-A2). 

The ILC allegation covers 20 months. A cloud decision made once, for convenience, can run that long before anyone checks it. 

The SSP Has to Describe the System You Run Today 

NIST SP 800-171 requirement 3.12.4 calls for a system security plan that is developed, documented, and periodically updated. The DoW CIO’s CMMC Assessment Guide, Level 2 defines “periodically” as “occurring at a regular interval as determined by the OSA that may not exceed one year.” 

The SSP is also what the score rests on. Marking 3.12.4 Not Met produces “No CMMC Score” in SPRS (FAQ C-A10; 32 CFR 170.24). 

Every SSP is accurate on the day it is approved. The trouble starts the day after. 

Known Gaps Belong in a Plan of Action 

Requirement 3.12.2 calls for plans of action designed to correct deficiencies and reduce or eliminate vulnerabilities. A gap that is documented, owned, and dated is a managed gap. A gap that sits in a consultant’s report with no plan behind it is the fourth row of the ILC table. 

The FAQ separates the two plan types a Level 2 environment uses. An Operational Plan of Action covers deficiencies that arise after the requirements were met, and a POA&M covers requirements found Not Met during an assessment, with 180 days to close (C-A9). 

The SPRS Score Has to Be Current and Built From the SSP 

DFARS 252.204-7019 requires a current NIST SP 800-171 DoD Assessment in SPRS for covered contracts, which the clause defines as not more than 3 years old unless the solicitation sets a shorter period. The score comes from the DoD Assessment Methodology applied to the SSP. 

That makes the score a representation. If the SSP behind it no longer matches the environment, neither does the score. 

Where These Gaps Show Up in a Microsoft Environment 

The cloud allegation is the one we see most often start small. Microsoft’s DFARS compliance documentation names Azure Government, Office 365 U.S. Government, and Office 365 U.S. Government Defense as the services where it supports the 7012 requirements for cloud service providers. It makes no such statement for commercial Microsoft 365. 

The tenant is rarely the only cloud in play. Engineering, manufacturing, and quality documents travel through file-sharing services, PLM and ERP platforms, supplier portals, and backup services, and each one holding CUI has to meet the same requirement.  

The SSP drifts in the tenant too. A new conditional access policy, an external sharing setting, a connected app, or a second tenant brought in through an acquisition changes the system the SSP describes. The FAQ’s change sequence (F-A5) exists so those changes reach the SSP before they reach the next affirmation: a security impact analysis, a review of CUI flow, a change record, and a review with the Affirming Official before the change; an Operational Plan of Action during it; an updated SSP after it, reviewed with the Affirming Official before the next annual affirmation. 

The Case Started Inside the Company 

The ILC case was filed by the companies’ former Director of Cybersecurity, under the False Claims Act’s whistleblower provisions, and that relator will receive $2.35 million of the settlement. Honeywell’s began with a former employee. Swiss Automation, a precision machining subcontractor that settled in December 2025 for $421,234, began with a former quality-control manager. 

The person who knows where the gaps are is usually on staff. Qui tam complaints are filed under seal, so an organization may not learn a case exists until DoJ has already investigated it. [Link: 31 U.S.C. 3730(b)(2), filing under seal.] 

The record that holds up in that situation is the one that already exists: gaps written down, plans with owners and dates, and an SSP that matches the tenant. An undocumented gap is the one an insider can describe and the organization cannot answer. 

The Phase II Suspension Did Not Move Any of This 

The Department of War’s July 13 release keeps every Phase I self-assessment requirement in place. The DoW CIO’s implementing memo states that the requirements in DFARS 252.204-7012 remain in effect. 

DoJ has said where its cyber work is heading in its own words. Its FY2025 False Claims Act fact sheet says civil cybersecurity fraud settlements “have more than tripled in each of the past two years.” In June, a Civil Division official told Congress that the Department had “opened numerous, non-public, cyber fraud matters.” 

The timeline moved. The obligation did not. 

A Self-Check Built From the Five Allegations 

Each row below is one ILC allegation turned into a question you can answer with a document. The rows are not equal in weight. The first two cover most of the exposure we see.  

QuestionThe document that answers it
Does every cloud service holding CUI, inside and outside the Microsoft tenant, meet FedRAMP Moderate or equivalency?An inventory of services that touch CUI, each with its FedRAMP Marketplace listing or equivalency evidence
Does the SSP describe the environment as it runs today?The current SSP version, dated within your review interval, with changes since approval reflected in it
Is every known gap on a plan of action with an owner and a date?The current POA&M or Operational Plan of Action, cross-checked against the last internal or third-party review
Is the SPRS score current and built from that SSP?The SPRS entry date, the assessment that produced it, and the SSP version it was scored against
Are the controls implemented, or only written down?Evidence by requirement: configuration exports, logs, and records that show the control operating

Confirm Your SSP and SPRS Score Still Describe Your Environment 

Agile IT builds and secures the Microsoft environments these requirements apply to, in GCC High and Azure Government, and maps each setting to NIST SP 800-171 for the SSP. A validation review compares the tenant, the SSP, and the score against each other, before anyone else does. 

Confirm your SSP and SPRS score still describe your environment. 

If DoJ read your SSP next to your tenant today, which row of that table would it start with? 

Frequently Asked Questions 

Did the CMMC Phase II suspension change cybersecurity obligations under DFARS 252.204-7012? 

No. The Department of War’s July 13, 2026 release keeps Phase I self-assessment requirements in place, and the DoW CIO’s implementing memo states that DFARS 252.204-7012 requirements remain in effect. 

Does a False Claims Act cybersecurity case require a data breach? 

No. The ILC, Honeywell, and LOGZONE releases describe requirements that were not met, such as an SSP not kept current, controls not implemented, and assessments not submitted. None describes a breach. 

What does “current” mean for a NIST SP 800-171 assessment in SPRS? 

DFARS 252.204-7019 defines a current assessment as not more than 3 years old, unless the solicitation sets a shorter period. 

Does an encrypted file stored in a non-FedRAMP cloud service still count as CUI? 

Yes. Encrypted CUI keeps its designation (FAQ B-A8), and a cloud service storing it still has to meet the FedRAMP Moderate requirement (FAQ E-A2). 

How often does a system security plan have to be updated? 

At an interval the organization sets, no longer than one year, according to the CMMC Assessment Guide’s definition of “periodically,” and after changes that affect the system, following the sequence in FAQ F-A5. 

Scoping CUI Correctly the First Time 

Scope is the one CMMC decision you pay for twice when it is wrong. You pay once to build the boundary, and again to move it after assessment prep, a prime’s questionnaire, or your own Affirming Official finds CUI on the wrong side of it. 

Every other part of a Level 2 program inherits that boundary. The System Security Plan (SSP) describes it, the 110 NIST SP 800-171 requirements are implemented inside it, and the score your organization posts in the Supplier Performance Risk System (SPRS) speaks for it. 

The rules for drawing it are written down. They sit in 32 CFR 170.19, the DoW CIO’s CMMC Level 2 Scoping Guide, version 2.13, and Section F of the CMMC Program FAQ, Revision 2.4. Below, we apply those documents to the Microsoft environments defense contractors run. 

The Timeline Moved. The Scoping Rules Did Not. 

The Department of War suspended CMMC Phase II on July 13, 2026. However, the same release keeps every Phase I Level 2 self-assessment requirement in place, and the DoW CIO’s implementing memo states that the requirements in DFARS 252.204-7012 remain in effect. 

A Level 2 self-assessment is scoped under 32 CFR 170.19, the same section that governs a Level 2 third-party certification assessment. Moving the third-party date did not change the scope of what is assessed for a Level 2 certification nor does it change what belongs inside the certification boundary. 

In both cases, your organization draws the boundary, and your Affirming Official affirms it in SPRS under 32 CFR 170.22. In a certification assessment, a third-party assessor validates that scope; it does not set it. The affirmation is a representation to the government either way. 

Trace the Data Before You Draw the Boundary 

Scope starts with where CUI goes. The server room and the org chart come later, if at all. 

Start from the contracts carrying DFARS 252.204-7012 and list what each one delivers to you: drawings, specifications, technical data, test results. Your contract with the government or prime contractor should clearly articulate what will be considered CUI; if those details are lacking, it is worth the conversation to see if you can get more clarity. 32 CFR Part 2002  provides a general definition of what counts as CUI, and the DoW’s CUI Quick Reference Guide provides guidance on marking CUI. 

Then follow one CUI item from arrival to destruction. A drawing that comes in by email lands in a mailbox, gets saved to a OneDrive folder, syncs to a laptop, goes to a shared Teams channel for review, and prints on the plotter by the shop floor. Every system that stores, processes, or transmits CUI needs to be tracked as a CUI Asset. 

Two FAQ answers close the usual escape routes. CUI stays CUI when encrypted (B-A8), and hard-copy CUI joins the information system the moment someone scans, photographs, uploads, or emails it (C-A11). 

Scope diagrams have a long tradition of describing the network someone intended to build. The data flow describes the one that exists. 

Only Out-of-Scope Assets Need Separation 

The Scoping Guide sorts every asset into one of five categories, and the assessment treatment differs sharply between them. 

Category What it is How it is assessed 
CUI Assets Process, store, or transmit CUI Against all Level 2 security requirements 
Security Protection Assets Provide security functions or capabilities within the assessment scope Against the Level 2 requirements relevant to the capabilities provided 
Contractor Risk Managed Assets Not intended to, but capable of, processing, storing, or transmitting CUI Reviewed through the SSP; the assessor can run a limited check, and assets insufficiently documented in the SSP are assessed against CMMC requirements 
Specialized Assets Government Furnished Equipment, operational technology, restricted information systems, test equipment, IoT and IIoT Documented in the SSP as managed under the organization’s risk-based policies; not assessed against the CMMC L2 requirements 
Out-of-Scope Assets Cannot process, store, or transmit CUI, provide no security protection for CUI Assets, and are physically or logically separated from CUI Assets Not assessed; the organization justifies why they cannot handle CUI 

Source: CMMC Level 2 Scoping Guide v2.13, Table 1 and pages 5 to 9. 

One sentence in the guide settles an argument that keeps recurring: “Effective separation involves logically or physically separating assets and is required only for Out-of-Scope Assets.” A Contractor Risk Managed Asset does not need a dedicated network or a firewall between it and your CUI. It needs an SSP entry that holds up. 

The guide also closes the loophole in the other direction: “An asset that falls into any in-scope asset category cannot be considered an Out-of-Scope Asset.” Calling a laptop out of scope does not make it out of scope if it can reach CUI in a file share. 

And it limits the reach of the rule. In its guidance on enclaves, page 12 of the Level 2 Scoping Guide states that enterprise-wide controls do “not mean all assets across the entire OSA enterprise are automatically part of a CMMC Assessment Scope.” Your organization makes the boundary decision and has to defend it, so make that decision deliberately. 

Your Commercial Tenant Is in Scope Until Something Proves Otherwise 

In the environments we assess before a migration, CUI is more often on premises than in the cloud. Someone downloads a drawing from a government web portal and saves it to a local file share, and from then on the file share, its server, its backups, and every workstation that opens it are CUI Assets. Other organizations are not yet handling CUI at all and are preparing for the contract that will bring it. 

That matters for two reasons. The mailboxes, OneDrive accounts, SharePoint sites, and Teams chats holding CUI will be classified as CUI Assets, and the cloud service holding them has to meet DFARS 252.204-7012’s cloud requirement: security equivalent to the FedRAMP Moderate baseline (FAQ E-A1). Encrypting the files first does not change the requirement that a cloud service provider be FedRAMP moderate approved (E-A2). 

Microsoft’s own DFARS compliance documentation names Azure Government, Office 365 U.S. Government, and Office 365 U.S. Government Defense as the services where it supports the 7012 requirements that apply to cloud service providers. It makes no such statement for commercial Microsoft 365.  

So the first scoping question in a Microsoft environment is a plain one: Where do you intend to hold CUI? The answer decides whether you are scoping a stand-alone environment or planning a migration. 

There are two common answers to where it should go instead. Move the whole organization into GCC High, or move the part of it that handles CUI into a GCC High enclave and keep the commercial tenant for everyone else. We covered the second path in moving one division into GCC High. 

The Microsoft Asset Map 

This is the table we wish every organization had before its first scoping workshop. It maps common components of a Microsoft environment to the category they usually land in. Your environment decides the final answer, and the reason column is what the SSP has to say. 

Component Usual category Why 
GCC High tenant workloads holding CUI (Exchange Online, SharePoint, OneDrive, Teams) CUI Asset They store, process, and transmit CUI 
Commercial Microsoft 365 tenant where CUI has landed The MS Commercial environment does not satisfy the requirements of the DFARS 7012 (a)-(g) clauses and it not able to hold CUI. CUI in the Commercial environment needs to be moved to a FedRAMP moderate or moderate equivalent environment.  It holds CUI; plan to move the data and confirm the cloud requirement in DFARS 7012 
Commercial tenant kept for non-CUI work after a GCC High enclave is built Out-of-Scope Asset, if separation holds and policy prohibits CUI. If still logically connected to the CUI network, the assets may need to be considered Contractor Risk Managed Assets. Out-of-scope status requires separation; identity sync and admin overlap get examined  Contractor Risk Managed Assets can access CUI, but have policy or technical controls limiting their access. These assets need to be identified in the asset inventory and addressed in the SSP 
Entra ID in the GCC High tenant Security Protection Asset  Provides authentication and access control for CUI Assets 
Microsoft Defender and Microsoft Sentinel monitoring CUI Assets Security Protection Asset The guide lists cloud-based security and SIEM tools as examples 
Intune managing devices that handle CUI Security Protection Asset  Enforces configuration and compliance on CUI Assets 
Managed laptops and desktops that store or process CUI CUI Asset They store or process CUI 
Azure Virtual Desktop or Windows 365 session hosts The cloud environment hosting the VDI is a CUI Asset; the endpoint is out of scope. CUI is processed inside the VDI session; per the Level 2 scoping guide, VDI endpoints are out of scope.  
Unmanaged device reaching the virtual desktop Out-of-Scope Asset only under FAQ F-A1 and F-A2 conditions; otherwise CUI Asset Depends entirely on verified server-side configuration 
Corporate laptops that policy bars from CUI but can reach it Contractor Risk Managed Asset Capable of handling CUI, not intended to; must be documented in the asset inventory and SSP 
Shop-floor CNC machines and test equipment Specialized Asset Operational technology and test equipment are named categories. Must be recorded in the asset inventory and SSP must address their security protections. Not required to meet CMMC L2 requirements 
Printers, plotters, and scanners that handle CUI CUI Asset They process CUI 
IT provider administering the tenant External Service Provider, assessed in your scope FAQ E-A4 
Cloud backup holding copies of CUI CUI Asset; any cloud service must meet the FedRAMP Moderate or equivalency requirements FAQ E-A1 and E-A2 

An Enclave Narrows Scope When the Separation Is Real 

An enclave—or a subset of the organization that is set up to store or process CUI—puts CUI and the people who handle it inside a smaller boundary, so the rest of the organization stays outside it. In Microsoft terms that usually means establishing a GCC High tenant for the specific staff that need to handle CUI, alongside a commercial tenant for the remainder of the organization.  

The FAQ sets two rules for that design. Encryption alone does not create logical separation, because logical separation “occurs when data transfer between physically connected assets… is prevented by non-physical means such as software or network assets” (F-A3). And properly encrypted CUI can cross enterprise networking components without pulling them into scope, “so long as the enclave is otherwise logically separated” (F-A4). 

“Otherwise” is where enclaves get tested. Cross-tenant identity sync, shared administrator accounts, mail forwarding rules between tenants, and a SharePoint site shared across the boundary for convenience are each open paths that the SSP needs to account for. 

An enclave also has a running cost. Some users carry two identities and two mailboxes for accessing both the commercial tenant and the GCCH tenant. IT maintains two collaboration environments, and sooner or later a file lands in the wrong one because nobody labeled it. Aan enclave is an attractive choice because the CUI footprint is small and stable, however, you need to plan for additional overhead before the build. 

A Virtual Desktop Keeps a Laptop Out of Scope Only When It Is Configured To 

A virtual desktop is the most common way to keep unmanaged or loosely managed devices out of scope. The Level 2 Scoping Guide lists it under Out-of-Scope Assets in Table 1 (page 4): an endpoint hosting a VDI client “configured to not allow any processing, storage, or transmission of CUI beyond the Keyboard/Video/Mouse sent to the VDI client.” The CMMC Program FAQ (F-A1 and F-A2) spells out what that configuration requires: 

  1. the session transmits only video, keyboard, and mouse data 
  1. copy-paste, file transfers, and any other data exchange across the session are blocked on the server side, and the configuration prevents copying (including screenshots), saving, or printing CUI to the endpoint 
  1. multifactor authentication to the virtual desktop server is separate from the unmanaged client, such as a hardware one-time password token or a PKI token with a PIN 
  1. only authorized users reach the environment, from allowable locations 

The FAQ is equally direct about the failure case: if the configuration lets the endpoint process, store, or transmit CUI, “the endpoint will be considered a CUI Asset and is in scope of the assessment.” It also adds that “proper configuration of the VDI client must be verified.” Verification means someone checked the server-side settings and the record shows it. 

Azure Virtual Desktop and Windows 365 both expose controls for clipboard, drive and printer redirection, and screen capture protection.  Microsoft Learn pages for AVD RDP properties and screen capture protection, pulled and checked the week this publishes. We compared the two for GCC High in AVD vs. Windows 365 in GCC High. 

Your Providers Are Inside the Boundary Whether They Touch CUI or Not 

The Scoping Guide states that “an External Service Provider (ESP) can be within the OSA’s scope of CMMC requirements.” The FAQ gives the case most organizations have: one provider runs IT support, another manages security tools, and no CUI goes to either. Both “will be assessed as part of the Organization Seeking Assessment’s assessment scope against applicable security requirements,” and neither needs its own CMMC certification (E-A4). 

That puts your provider’s access model in front of the assessor. Who holds administrator rights in the tenant, how those rights are granted, and who approved the last change are questions your provider’s practices have to answer, in writing. 

Whether a provider counts as a cloud service provider depends on the contract chain. If the tenant is licensed to your organization, a provider that resells or administers it is not a CSP (E-A5). 

Agile IT is an ESP in every tenant we administer, and the same questions apply to us. A shared responsibility matrix that names who owns each requirement is how that gets answered before anyone asks. 

Every Scope Change Goes to the Affirming Official 

Scope does not stay drawn. A new contract brings new CUI, an acquisition brings a new tenant, and a new tool brings a new path for data to travel. 

The FAQ places the call on whether a change is significant with the Affirming Official, who “bears the legal and contractual risk of continued compliance” (C-A12). It gives one bright line: a requirement assessed as N/A that becomes applicable after a change requires reassessment. Adding WiFi to a system that earned its status without WiFi is the FAQ’s own example. 

For everything else, F-A5 lays out the sequence: a security impact analysis and a review of CUI flow before the change, an Operational Plan of Action during it, and an updated SSP after it. The annual affirmation under 32 CFR 170.22 then covers whatever the boundary has become. 

A Defensible Scope Is a Set of Documents 

The Scoping Guide asks for the same three things for every in-scope category: an asset inventory, treatment in the SSP, and a network diagram. Contractor Risk Managed and Specialized Assets add a description of the risk-based practices that manage them. 

The contract side matters as much. Offerors identify every CMMC Unique Identifier (UID) used to handle FCI or CUI, the UIDs “must represent the scope of the CMMC assessment,” and any system not represented by them “cannot be used to process, store, or transmit FCI or CUI during contract performance” (C-A5). 

The SSP is the anchor for all of it. Marking the SSP requirement (CA.L2-3.12.4) as Not Met produces “No CMMC Score” in SPRS (C-A10; 32 CFR 170.24). 

Common Questions About CMMC Level 2 Scoping 

Does a Level 2 self-assessment use the same scoping rules as a certification assessment? 

Yes. 32 CFR 170.19 governs scoping for both, and the Level 2 Scoping Guide applies to both. 

Is encrypted CUI out of scope? 

No. Encrypted CUI keeps the designation of its plain-text counterpart under 32 CFR Part 2002 (FAQ B-A8), and a cloud service storing it still has to meet the FedRAMP Moderate requirement (FAQ E-A2). 

Can devices that connect to a virtual desktop be out of scope? 

Yes, when the virtual desktop is configured server-side to pass only video, keyboard, and mouse data, blocks copying, saving, and printing CUI to the endpoint, and uses multifactor authentication separate from the client (Scoping Guide, Table 1; FAQ F-A1, F-A2). The configuration must be verified. 

Does our IT provider need its own CMMC certification? 

No. A provider supporting your environment is assessed as part of your scope against applicable requirements and does not need its own certification (FAQ E-A3, E-A4). 

Is every asset on our network in scope? 

No. The Scoping Guide states that a defined scope does not automatically include every asset across the enterprise. Assets left out need to meet the Out-of-Scope definition, including separation from CUI Assets. 

Does a Contractor Risk Managed Asset need to be separated from CUI Assets? 

No. Separation is required only for Out-of-Scope Assets. Contractor Risk Managed Assets must be documented in the SSP, and the assessor can check them. 

Pressure-Test the Boundary Before You Build Inside It 

Every requirement your organization implements, documents, and affirms sits inside the boundary drawn at the start. Our engineers can walk your CUI flow against the Scoping Guide and the asset map above before the build starts, so the scope your SSP describes is the one you can defend. 
 Pressure-test your CMMC scope → CMMC readiness  

If you traced one drawing from the email that delivered it to the place it lives today, how many systems would you name, and are all of them in your SSP? 

CMMC Enclave: What It Actually Reduces, and What It Doesn’t 

A CMMC enclave doesn’t lower your obligation. It lowers how much of your environment has to prove it. 

CMMC Level 2 applies to the systems that store, process, or transmit CUI, not to every system an organization runs. An enclave draws a hard boundary around those specific systems, so the assessment covers that boundary instead of the whole network. The controls stay identical either way. What changes is how many systems they get applied to. 

What Actually Shrinks, and What Doesn’t 

The 110 NIST SP 800-171 controls across 14 control families don’t change based on where CUI lives. An enclave doesn’t remove a single one of them. It changes the count of systems, users, and endpoints those controls get enforced on and assessed against. 

That’s the entire mechanism. Access control, encryption, and monitoring get enforced in one defined zone instead of across an entire organization, which makes the controls easier to prove and the assessment faster to complete. Reducing scope reduces cost and audit footprint. It doesn’t reduce what the requirement actually demands. 

The Boundary Has to Be Right Before Anything Gets Built 

This is the same sequencing mistake that shows up in GCC High migrations, and it shows up here for the same reason: the boundary gets treated as a detail to confirm later instead of the decision everything else depends on. 

An enclave can be virtual, physical, or hybrid, and which one fits depends entirely on how CUI actually moves through the organization, not on which option sounds simplest to stand up. Some organizations keep two accounts per person, a standard account and a separate enclave account for CUI. Others move affected users fully into the enclave so it becomes their only environment. Get the boundary wrong first, and the account model, the network segmentation, and the technology choice all inherit that mistake. 

Define the boundary before any build work starts. Everything downstream, the architecture, the deployment, the validation, only holds up if that first decision was right. 

Not Every Organization Should Build One 

An enclave fits organizations that handle a limited, specific amount of CUI, want a smaller audit footprint, and have only a handful of people who actually touch that data. 

It fits less well when CUI is embedded across most teams rather than contained to a few, when an organization would rather outsource compliance entirely than manage a boundary, or when the added licensing cost of moving a subset of users into a GCC High environment doesn’t make sense against the budget. A more restrictive security posture inside the enclave can also disrupt how those specific users work, which is a real tradeoff, not a footnote. 

When the fit isn’t there, full CMMC Level 2 compliance across the environment is the more direct path. See what that looks like before assuming an enclave is the default answer. 

The Certification Is the Advantage, Not the Enclave 

The advantage was never the enclave itself. It’s holding the certification. An enclave built on GCC High covers a significant share of the technical controls and reduces what an assessor has to review, which makes the certification more achievable and less expensive to pursue. The enclave is the path. The certification is what actually gates the contract. 

The DoW pause on Phase 2 implementation hasn’t changed any of this. The timeline moved. The underlying requirement to protect CUI, and the contract eligibility tied to it, did not. 

What It Takes to Build One Correctly 

Discovery and planning come first: identifying where CUI actually lives, how it moves, and who touches it, before any boundary gets drawn. Design follows, choosing virtual, physical, or hybrid architecture based on that discovery, not before it. Deployment builds the systems and applies the required controls against that specific scope. 

Validation tests the configuration against the defined boundary and closes gaps before an assessor finds them. Then operations takes over: monitoring, user training, and continuous evidence collection, because certification is the first step, not the finish line. Annual affirmation and re-assessment are required regardless of how clean the original build was. 

Which decision has your organization actually made, where CUI lives and what boundary that draws, and which one is still an assumption nobody’s tested yet? 

See the full enclave build process, cost guidance, and qualifying questions on Agile IT’s CMMC Enclave page. 

CMMC Enclave FAQs 

What is a CMMC enclave, and why would I need one? 

A CMMC enclave is a segmented IT environment used specifically for handling Controlled Unclassified Information. Instead of applying CMMC requirements to your entire infrastructure, an enclave limits the compliance boundary, making it faster, cheaper, and easier to meet CMMC 2.0 standards. 

Is an enclave required for CMMC certification? 

No, an enclave isn’t required, but it’s often the most efficient and cost-effective approach for organizations that only handle CUI in specific roles or departments. By using an enclave, you reduce the number of systems and users in scope for your audit. 

Can an enclave be hosted in the cloud? 

Yes. CMMC enclaves can be deployed on-premises, in a virtualized private cloud, or in a compliant public cloud environment such as Microsoft GCC High or Azure Government. The choice depends on your business needs and IT strategy. 

How long does it take to implement a CMMC enclave? 

The timeline depends on your current infrastructure, the complexity of your environment, and how much preparation has already been done. For many defense contractors, Agile IT can help plan, implement, and validate a CMMC enclave in a matter of weeks. 

What’s included in the Agile IT CMMC Enclave service? 

CUI data flow discovery and scoping, network segmentation and boundary design, deployment of compliant controls including access, encryption, and logging, user training and documentation, and ongoing support as part of a managed offering if needed. 

What makes Agile IT qualified to deliver CMMC enclaves? 

Agile IT is a four-time Microsoft Partner of the Year, one of the original six authorized AOS-G partners, and a CMMC Registered Provider Organization (RPO). 

How much does a CMMC enclave cost? 

Costs vary depending on infrastructure size, licensing, and scope. Implementing a focused enclave is usually appreciably more affordable than applying CMMC controls across an entire network. 

Business Premium for GCC High vs. G5: What Smaller Contractors Actually Need 

Microsoft built Business Premium for GCC High because most smaller contractors don’t need everything a G5 license includes. They need the specific controls CMMC Level 2 requires, and G5 is one way to get there, not the only one. 

What Business Premium for GCC High Actually Covers 

Microsoft announced Business Premium for GCC High as a purpose-built plan for organizations under 500 seats. It carries the familiar productivity stack plus foundational security: Microsoft Defender for Business, Intune, and Entra ID P1. 

On its own, that’s roughly the GCC High equivalent of a mid-tier commercial plan. It wasn’t designed to carry the full compliance load by itself. 

The Defender for GCC-H and Purview for GCC-H add-ons close that gap. Per Microsoft’s own announcement, when paired with Business Premium for GCC High, these add-ons provide the required security and compliance capabilities to support customers in meeting CMMC Level 2 requirements. That’s Microsoft’s own positioning, not a reseller’s interpretation of it. 

What G5 Still Covers That the Add-On Stack Doesn’t 

G5 includes the full Defender and Purview suites natively, along with Entra ID P2. The Business Premium plus add-on combination reaches near parity on the controls that matter for a baseline NIST SP 800-171 environment, but it isn’t identical to G5. 

Broader identity governance tooling, multi-geo data residency options, and some of the larger-scale administrative controls stay G5-exclusive. An organization running a single-site operation under 500 seats is unlikely to need most of that. An organization scaling past that ceiling, or running a more complex identity environment, will. 

The honest version of this comparison isn’t “Business Premium matches G5.” It’s “Business Premium plus the right add-ons covers what a smaller contractor’s CMMC Level 2 environment actually needs, and G5 covers that plus a layer of enterprise-scale capability most smaller contractors aren’t using yet.” 

Moving to G5 Later Isn’t a New Migration 

If an organization outgrows the 500-seat range, moving to G5 doesn’t mean standing up a new tenant. Microsoft’s own documentation on changing plans states that user data, including Exchange mailboxes and SharePoint content, is retained through the change. 

It isn’t a single click, either. Business Premium sits in a different license family than G5, so the move gets handled as a manual plan switch, not an automatic in-place upgrade. Licenses get purchased and reassigned per user. The data stays where it is. The licensing work still has to happen. 

Why This Matters Specifically for Smaller Contractors 

The 500-seat ceiling isn’t a limitation bolted on afterward. It’s the design target. Microsoft positioned this plan specifically for smaller organizations, the kind that need to meet the same federal requirements as a prime but don’t have a prime’s headcount or budget to do it: a forty-person precision parts shop, a regional engineering firm on a single defense contract, an IT team of two supporting three hundred users. 

That matters because the underlying requirement doesn’t scale down. DFARS 252.204-7012 and NIST SP 800-171 apply the same way to a 40-person machine shop as they do to a 4,000-person prime. The licensing path to meet them can scale down. The requirement can’t. 

A license that supports the requirement still isn’t the same as an environment configured to meet it. The add-ons have to be turned on, mapped to the actual controls they’re meant to cover, and verified, not just purchased. 

If your organization is under 500 seats and hasn’t compared what Business Premium for GCC High with the compliance add-ons would actually cover against your current environment, is that worth a conversation before your next renewal decides it for you? 

Business Premium for GCC High vs. G5 FAQs 

What’s included in Business Premium for GCC High by default? 

The core productivity stack plus foundational security: Microsoft Defender for Business, Intune, and Entra ID P1. It’s designed for organizations under 500 seats. 

Do the Defender and Purview GCC-H add-ons make Business Premium equivalent to G5? 

Not identical. The combination reaches near parity on the controls most smaller contractors need for a NIST SP 800-171 baseline, but G5 still includes broader identity governance and multi-geo capabilities most smaller organizations aren’t using. 

Is Business Premium for GCC High, with the add-ons, enough for CMMC Level 2? 

Per Microsoft’s own announcement, the Defender and Purview GCC-H add-ons paired with Business Premium for GCC High provide the security and compliance capabilities to support CMMC Level 2 requirements. Whether a specific environment actually meets the requirement still depends on how those add-ons are configured, not just whether they’re licensed. 

When does an organization actually need G5 instead? 

Once an organization grows past the 500-seat range, or needs enterprise-scale identity governance, multi-geo data residency, or administrative capabilities the add-on stack doesn’t reach, G5 becomes the more direct path. 

Does moving from Business Premium to G5 later require a new migration? 

No. Microsoft’s own documentation confirms user data, including mailboxes and SharePoint content, carries over through a plan change. It’s a manual license switch rather than an automatic upgrade, so licenses have to be reassigned, but the environment itself doesn’t get rebuilt.

The Eleven Months After Your CMMC Assessment

A CMMC assessment confirms an environment on one day. The attestation that follows requires it to still be true eleven months later, backed by the weight of the False Claims Act. 

Documentation says one thing. The environment does another, not because anyone lied, but because systems change faster than the paperwork describing them. AgileThrive closes that distance on a set schedule, so the explanation is already documented before anyone asks for it. 

What AgileThrive Actually Covers 

AgileThrive is the Thrive piece of Agile IT’s three-part service family: Secure for deployment and licensing, Defend for managed cloud operations, Thrive for staying audit-ready once the environment is live and a contract depends on it. 

The work itself is specific, not a general retainer. It keeps the CUI boundary defined as systems and users change, and keeps the System Security Plan current with whatever that boundary actually looks like this quarter. Living policies and procedures get reviewed on set cadences, not drafted once and filed away. POA&M items and corrective actions move toward closure instead of accumulating. The periodic reviews CMMC Level 2 already requires happen on a documented schedule, rather than whenever someone remembers to run one. 

Not a Gap Assessment, and Not the Assessment Itself 

A gap assessment captures a single moment. AgileThrive is the ongoing structure that keeps scope, evidence, and documentation aligned with the environment between assessments, not a replacement for either. 

It doesn’t replace the C3PAO assessment. An organization still goes through that process on its own schedule. AgileThrive is what keeps the answer to “is this still true” from turning into a scramble in the weeks before that assessment comes back around. 

Who Owns What 

Agile IT owns documentation structure, evidence tracking, and review cadence within the agreed scope. The organization owns governance decisions and final sign-off on its own attestation. 

That division isn’t a formality. An accredited assessor validates evidence; they don’t guide it, generate it, or own it, and Agile IT is not a C3PAO. AgileThrive keeps the paperwork honest about the environment. It doesn’t decide what the environment should be, and it doesn’t stand in for the sign-off that has to come from inside the organization. 

How the Engagement Actually Runs 

Onboarding establishes current scope, documentation, and gaps against NIST SP 800-171 requirements. From there, open POA&M items move toward closure while documentation gets brought current, and a recurring review cycle takes over once scope, evidence, and governance actually match what the environment does. That cycle runs on a set schedule going forward, not on whoever happens to remember it’s due. 

Whose Evidence Trail Would Hold Up if Someone Asked for It Tomorrow? 

FAQ 

What actually changes between an assessment and an attestation? An assessment captures the environment at a single point in time. An attestation claims the picture from the last assessment is still accurate. Scope shifts, staff turns over, new systems come online, and policies written once sit untouched for a year. That distance is what surfaces when the next assessment, or the next attestation, asks the environment to explain itself. 

Does AgileThrive handle the periodic reviews CMMC Level 2 requires? Yes. Several CMMC Level 2 objectives require reviews that have to be performed and documented on a recurring schedule. AgileThrive runs those reviews on a set cadence, checking scope, risk, and documentation each time, with ownership explicit throughout. 

How does AgileThrive relate to Agile IT’s other services? AgileThrive is the Thrive piece of a three-part service family. Secure covers deployment and licensing. Defend covers managed cloud operations. Thrive keeps the environment audit-ready once it’s live and a contract depends on it. 

What happens first in an AgileThrive engagement? Onboarding. It establishes current scope, documentation, and gaps against NIST SP 800-171 requirements before anything else moves.

Pressure-Test Your Evidence Trail → https://agileit.com/agile-thrive/ 

The Backup Nobody Checked Against the Boundary 

Every organization we migrate into GCC High already has backups running before we touch the tenant. Almost none of them have confirmed where those backups land. 

That gap isn’t hypothetical. DFARS 252.204-7012 requires covered contractor information systems to implement NIST SP 800-171. Control 3.8.9 states it plainly: protect the confidentiality of backup CUI at storage locations. 

What Control 3.8.9 Requires 

The requirement is narrower than most people assume. It doesn’t say an organization must have a backup. It says that wherever CUI ends up once it’s backed up, that copy’s confidentiality has to be protected the same way the original is, typically through encryption and access control at the storage location itself. 

That distinction matters, because most organizations already pass the easy version of this question. Yes, we have backups. The harder question is where those backups live, and whether anyone has ever checked. 

Where the Backup Actually Lands 

A backup vendor selected for uptime and price, often years before GCC High was even under discussion, doesn’t automatically inherit the boundary a CUI environment now sits inside. 

Microsoft’s own documentation shows the parity gap directly. Azure Backup’s support matrix limits Resource Health monitoring for backup vaults to “all Azure public regions, except Sovereign clouds,” and scopes Zone-Redundant Storage to a named list of regions that includes US Gov Virginia for some workloads and not others. Azure Site Recovery’s overview documentation doesn’t address Azure Government or GCC High support at all. It has to be confirmed separately, service by service. 

None of that means these tools can’t be used inside a compliance boundary. It means the fact that a backup exists, and the fact that it’s a backup built for GCC High, are two different facts. Only one of them satisfies 3.8.9. 

What “Protected” Really Means Once It’s Backed Up 

Confidentiality isn’t a single checkbox. Azure Backup encrypts data at rest by default using platform-managed keys, Microsoft’s own keys, held and rotated on Microsoft’s schedule, not the organization’s. 

An organization can move to customer-managed keys instead, stored in Azure Key Vault or a managed HSM, with its own rotation schedule and its own access control on who can unwrap them. That’s a real control gain. It’s also a one-way door: once customer-managed keys are turned on for a vault, there’s no reverting to the platform-managed default. 

NIST SP 800-171 control 3.13.11 adds a second requirement most teams don’t connect to backups at all: when cryptography protects the confidentiality of CUI, that cryptography has to be FIPS-validated. Microsoft’s own documentation on customer-managed keys for backup vaults doesn’t state a FIPS validation status either way. That’s a detail to confirm against Microsoft’s own FIPS compliance documentation, not assume from the encryption feature description alone. 

The Assumption That Costs the Most 

The organizations we see get this wrong aren’t the ones without backups. They’re the ones whose backup vendor was never re-evaluated after the environment around it became a CUI boundary. 

A Recovery Services vault’s sovereign-cloud footnote will never win an award for compelling reading, but it’s exactly the kind of detail an assessment doesn’t forgive skipping. 

Confirming where a backup lands, and whether that location was ever evaluated against a CUI boundary, is a short conversation. It’s far shorter than the one that happens after an assessor asks the same question and the answer is silence. 

Where Do Your Backups Live, and Has Anyone Checked? 

Commercial vs. GCC vs. GCC High: Which Microsoft Cloud Do You Need? 

Y’all. If I had a dollar every time someone asked me “can’t we just use GCC?” I could retire, buy a boat, and name it Sub-Paragraphs (c) through (g).  (I would not do this, my dad says it’s better to have friends with boats than to own a boat yourself.) 

This question comes up constantly, and it makes sense. Microsoft has a LOT of clouds. The names sound similar, the licensing is confusing, and every MSP in the DIB seems to have a different opinion. The good news is that Richard Wakeman at Microsoft keeps a long, very thorough post called Understanding Compliance Between Commercial, Government, DoD & Secret Offerings. He’s kept it updated for years, and it’s basically the source of truth on this. If you haven’t read it, go bookmark it now. I’ll wait. 

…OK, it’s long. I GOTCHU. Here’s the Maggie version, and we’re skipping the DoD and Secret clouds, because if you need those, you already know. 

The Three Clouds 

Commercial is regular Microsoft 365. It’s global, it gets new features first, and support comes from wherever in the world someone is awake. It’s great for most businesses. It was not built for US government requirements, and it probably doesn’t work for you if you’re reading this. 

GCC (Government Community Cloud) keeps your data stored in the US (data residency) and has screened US persons handling customer content. But it still shares a lot of plumbing with Commercial, including directory and authentication services that can process data outside the US.  It’s built on top of Azure Commercial, which is worldwide. 

GCC High is the sovereign cloud. It’s a separate environment, operated by screened US persons in US locations, and it’s the one where Microsoft commits to keeping data processing in the US and in US hands. That’s data sovereignty, and it’s a whole different thing from residency.  GCC High leverages Azure Government.  This is important. 

Residency vs. Sovereignty (aka the part everyone skims and shouldn’t) 

This is the crux of the whole thing, so I’m giving it its own section. 

  • Data residency = where your data lives 
  • Data sovereignty = who can touch it, where it’s processed, and under whose rules 

GCC gives you residency. GCC High gives you sovereignty. When you’re dealing with export-controlled information (ITAR/EAR) or the more sensitive categories of CUI, residency alone doesn’t cut it. As Richard puts it, CUI effectively requires data sovereignty. (Mic drop, Richard.) 

So what do the regulations say? 

Let’s go through the ones we care about. 

DFARS 252.204-7012: If you handle Covered Defense Information, your cloud provider has to meet FedRAMP Moderate (or equivalent) and flow down the incident reporting, forensics, and media preservation requirements, which is sub-paragraphs (c)–(g). Microsoft does not support DFARS 7012 for Commercial M365 productivity services. GCC and GCC High both do. 

ITAR/EAR: Commercial, no. GCC, no. GCC High, yes. That’s the whole list. GCC High was literally created to give contractors a US commitment for export controls. If you have ITAR data and you’re in GCC, I love you, but we need to talk. 

CUI: Here it gets murky. GCC may be fine for some CUI Basic. But CUI Specified categories like Controlled Technical Information, export-controlled data, and defense-related CUI are where GCC stops being a safe bet. GCC High covers all of it. 

CMMC: For Level 1 (FCI only), any of the three works. For Level 2 and up, where CUI comes in, Microsoft recommends GCC High. GCC is a “caveated yes,” and Commercial isn’t recommended. 

Now, the caveat to the caveat: GCC High isn’t the only road to Level 2. Solutions like PreVeil add an encrypted layer for your CUI (email and files) that sits alongside your existing Microsoft 365, which means you can meet CMMC Level 2 while staying in GCC. For some orgs, especially smaller ones where only a handful of people touch CUI, that can be a smart, cost-effective move. It’s a different architecture with its own tradeoffs, so scope it carefully, but it’s a legit option. 

“But GCC High is expensive and annoying” 

Yes. I’m not going to pretend otherwise. It costs more, some features show up later than in Commercial (because government clouds have to pass compliance gates first), and a few third-party integrations take extra work. 

But here’s the thing: moving between clouds is painful. GCC High is a separate environment, so migrating into it later means real time, real money, and real disruption. If you’re in the DIB and CUI is anywhere in your future, whether that’s a new contract, a new prime, or a new flow-down clause, picking the right cloud now is way cheaper than fixing it in the middle of a CMMC assessment (lol you will not be able to fix it mid-assessment, your assessment is getting paused until you completely redo your CMMC scope). 

And be honest with yourself about what data you have. A lot of companies say “oh, we don’t really have CUI” and then… they do. It’s in an email thread from 2019. It’s in a SharePoint folder named “Misc.” We’ve seen it. Many times. 

The Maggie Cheat Sheet 

If you… You probably need… 
Only handle FCI (CMMC Level 1) Commercial or GCC can work 
Are a federal civilian contractor with CUI Basic GCC 
Have ITAR or EAR data GCC High. Full stop. 
Are a DIB contractor pursuing CMMC Level 2 GCC High (Microsoft’s recommendation), or GCC plus a solution like PreVeil 
Are “not sure” what data you have A scoping conversation before any migration 

Why this matters 

CMMC is here, and “we’ll figure it out later” is no longer a strategy. The cloud you choose becomes the foundation for your whole compliance program. It affects your SSP, your shared responsibility matrix, your assessment scope, and how much of your life you’ll lose explaining your architecture to an assessor. A bad foundation doesn’t get better by adding more policies on top of it. 

Microsoft has been very clear about where it stands. Richard’s post lays it out better than anyone, and I’d encourage every IT lead and compliance owner in the DIB to read the full thing, especially the sections on export controls and CUI. 

And if you read it and your brain feels like soup, that’s normal, and it’s exactly what we do all day at Agile IT. We’ve been moving defense contractors into GCC High for years, and we’re happy to help you figure out which cloud fits your data, your contracts, and your budget. 

LFG. 

Azure Government vs. Commercial Azure for a CUI Workload 

Azure Government and commercial Azure aren’t different tiers of the same thing. They’re different answers to different questions. 

The question commercial Azure answers is: does this environment meet the security baseline the government requires. The question Azure Government answers is: does this environment also restrict who can touch it, and where it physically runs. Conflating the two is what sends organizations into this decision asking the wrong question. 

The Compliance Boundary Is Closer Than Most Organizations Assume 

Both environments hold a FedRAMP High Provisional Authorization to Operate from the Joint Authorization Board. Microsoft states this directly: “Both Azure and Azure Government maintain FedRAMP High P-ATOs issued by the JAB,” on top of more than 400 Moderate and High ATOs issued by individual federal agencies for in-scope services. Commercial Azure’s P-ATO covers its United States public regions specifically. Regions outside the US aren’t in that scope. 

Personnel, Not Certification, Is the Real Dividing Line 

Microsoft draws the actual line between the two environments around who can access the data, not which controls are certified. Azure Government “provides additional customer assurances through controls that limit potential access to systems processing customer data to screened US persons.” Personnel with that access undergo a Tier 3 Investigation and citizenship verification. Commercial Azure staff still pass Microsoft’s standard background checks. They don’t clear that additional bar. 

Region Is a Physical Fact, Not a Configuration Setting 

Azure Government runs from three dedicated regions: US Gov Arizona, US Gov Texas, and US Gov Virginia. The isolation is physical, not logical only: separate hardware, biometric access controls, and no direct peering with the public internet or Microsoft’s corporate network. Azure Government reaches the internet only by routing through the commercial Azure network’s transport capability. Commercial Azure’s regions carry none of those restrictions. 

The Question That Actually Decides This 

DFARS 252.204-7012(b)(2)(ii)(D) sets the real trigger. It applies “if the Contractor intends to use an external cloud service provider to store, process, or transmit any covered defense information,” and it requires that provider to meet security equivalent to the FedRAMP Moderate baseline. Nothing in that clause names Azure Government by name. 

A workload that is provably outside the CUI boundary, one that never stores, processes, or transmits covered defense information, doesn’t trigger the clause at all. Commercial Azure is defensible there, on the strength of scope, not on the strength of the platform. Since commercial Azure’s US regions already hold FedRAMP High, a level above the Moderate baseline the clause requires, a workload that does fall inside the boundary can, in principle, still meet that specific requirement on commercial Azure. 

What commercial Azure doesn’t give that workload is the personnel and physical restriction Azure Government was built around. Whether that gap matters depends on what else is riding on the contract: a prime’s flow-down requirement, a program office’s own architecture standard, or a decision the organization made and can defend on its own terms. The FedRAMP clause alone doesn’t require it. Something else usually does. 

The Misconception That Costs the Most 

Organizations tend to bring one assumption into this decision before any of the above gets discussed: that Azure Government is the requirement, rather than one way of satisfying a requirement that is really about scope and access control. That assumption skips the actual question, which is whether the workload sits inside the CUI boundary in the first place, and if it does, what specifically is asking for screened-personnel access on top of the FedRAMP baseline. 

Over-scoping into Azure Government for a workload that was never in the boundary spends budget a defensible architecture didn’t need to spend. Under-scoping a workload that is in the boundary, and assuming commercial Azure alone closes the question, leaves a gap the next assessment finds. 

Which Question Is This Workload Actually Answering? 

Is this workload storing, processing, or transmitting covered defense information, or has it been treated that way without anyone checking?

Is CMMC Dead?

Is Russia in charge now? What on earth does the DoW mean by “CMMC Phase II is paused”?

July 13, 2026 – a day that will live in infamy

Jk, it won’t really. This is a blip in a program roll out that has had many blips over the years. Some of the blips are really beneficial (removing the delta 20 out of CMMC 1.0, for example). Some are not. None of them will stop what will eventually be the CMMC program in its full (codified, legal) glory.

Jolene

It is important that you all know that yesterday was also Jolene’s birthday.

Holy hell you guys, it’s been a wild 24 hours. The most important thing that happened yesterday, obvs, is that Baby Jolene turned THREE and I am still in shock that she’s not a baby baby anymore. The second most important thing is that DoW issued a press release announcing the immediate suspension of the CMMC Phase II requirements. This is legit insane behavior, but sure, do you, guys.

The link to the press release: Forging the Arsenal of Freedom: Department of War Suspends CMMC Phase II Requirements > U.S. Department of War > Release | U.S. Department of War

The press release basically says “we can’t let a little thing like paperwork slow us down, we need to do WAR”. It goes on to say that this is being done for small and mid-sized businesses to ensure they can still participate in the space – the SBA had put out a report that compliance with CMMC is forcing innovative companies out of the DIB. This might be true? It’s probably true. Please remember that contractors have been saying they’ve been compliant FOR ALMOST TEN FREAKING YEARS. The thing CMMC is doing is bringing in third-party auditing. The cost of the audit isn’t prohibitive, it’s getting compliant WITH THE THING THEY’VE BEEN LYING ABOUT that’s prohibitive.

Anyway. Yes, we need to be able to move quickly as we respond to threats around the world. Yes, we need to ensure innovators and precision manufacturers and the entire dang supply chain can provide the services and machines the Department needs. And to be fair, it really did seem like SOMETHING was going to break in November 2026 when Phase II rolled out – there are approximately 100 C3PAOs as of this writing, and 200,000 DIB contractors that need to be assessed. That’s a lot of math that doesn’t quite work. That being said… is it the assessment that’s hard? Or is it getting into compliance that’s the ACTUAL brunt of the work? Maybe we have enough assessment orgs but DON’T have enough qualified consultants to help Dibbies get where they need to be.

I’m off track here. Ok, back to what happened yesterday. Press release came out. It’s a short read, go read it. It ends with a link to a new section of the DoW CIO website called Brilliant Basics. We’ll get into that hot mess later.

We also got two memos (cute). One from Kirsten Davies (DoW CIO) and one from Michael Duffey (USD for A&S).

Kirsten Davies said we need to be prepared for war and the current CMMC program doesn’t allow for the rapid scaling of our warfighting capabilities. She is also establishing a CMMC Reform Task Force that will have 60 days to review the program and provide recommendations for a better framework. (lol sure Jan). Listen, the program has ISSUES. But it’s still a whole lot better than what we had before. CMMC-ReformMemo.pdf

Ms. Davies also made a short speech worth listening to, which is posted to the DoW CIO website: CIO – Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification She’s really on that “this is for the warfighter and the small businesses” line that they’ve got going. Also ended with “peace through technical strength”, so that’s a line we have now.

Michael Duffey basically said the same thing, aligning to Hegseth’s 5 pillars of the Acquisition Transformation Strategy. He also included an attachment that has guidance for Program Managers re: assessments and solicitations. He did explicitly state that the cybersecurity reporting requirements in DFARS 252.204-7012 are still v much alive and well. (good, the DFARS clauses that we think about are a GOOD THING FOR NATIONAL SECURITY) ImplementingSuspensionCMMC-PhaseII.pdf

ALSO yesterday, CMMC disappeared completely for a few hours from the DoW CIO website. It’s back, and it is less: CIO – About CMMC They’ve taken out every mention of what Level 2 (C3PAO) or Level 3 (DIBCAC) assessments might look like. There is an update to the FAQs, but mostly in the “we’re paused in Phase 1” kind of way. These FAQs are important to know, though, so suggest familiarizing yourself: CYBERSECURITY MATURITY MODEL CERTIFICATION Program (CMMC) FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS

LASTLY (maybe, I’ll probably add to this bc who knows what else will happen): DoW CIO added a new “Brilliant Basics” section to their website. It is… basic. Someone said “what if we took all the meat out of NIST 800-171 and added graphics?” and then put it on an actual Dept website. A fun thing here is that backups are in scope for this Basics thing? Backups are not required in NIST 800-171 (fwiw, back shit up. It’s not that hard and it is wildly important). Brilliant at the Basics

Editorialized

I know I’ve been restrained in my thoughts and feelings, so if you don’t want to hear how I feel, you can stop reading now – you’ve got the gist of what went down yesterday.

THE DFARS IS CORRECT, WE NEED REGULATION ON THE DEFENSE SUPPLY CHAIN. It’s not a coincidence that China produced the J-35 fighter jet after we built the F-35. We KNOW that non-kinetic warfare and industrial espionage are on the rise. The entire war landscape is rapidly changing as our defense contractors build autonomous drones and vessels, AI-powered missiles, and quantum cryptography. If we can’t stay ahead of our enemies, or if we LET OUR DAMN TECHNOLOGY FALL INTO THEIR HANDS, where is our advantage? How are we protecting our troops at home and abroad?

We already saw what happened when self-assessment and self-attestation were the standard. DIB contractors blatantly disregarded the entire framework that was designed specifically to keep the information that they are handling safe. And they LIED ABOUT IT. There are lives at stake when we don’t adequately protect our information. Our technical prowess means nothing if we let it fall into a rival power’s hands. And we KNOW that without third-party accountability, the cybersecurity measures that we have determined are vital DO NOT TAKE PLACE.

We need to keep America, and Americans, safe. That includes safeguarding information across the defense industrial base.

CMMC is taking a beat, as is 100% normal when a new CIO comes in. It is not over, not by a long shot. And all the contractors breathing a sigh of relief about spending time & money on compliance are flat out WRONG and the DoJ is looking forward to having a word with them.

The requirements haven’t changed. They honestly haven’t really changed since Dec 31, 2017. It is BEYOND time for defense contractors to GET THEIR SHIT TOGETHER.

And you guys, Agile IT legit knows how to help. We know this stuff. So LFG.

CMMC Quick(ish) Reference Guide 

Y’all, I have spent TIME wrapping my head around CMMC and let me tell ya – it is a LOT. I’m not an expert by any means (if that’s what you’re looking for, go talk to my man Mike Shughrue), but I’ve been able to learn a bit and thought it might be helpful to have some consolidated info. Are you new to Agile IT? Are you new to CMMC? Are you just trying to remember how to find the results of the DoD’s audit of ISOO? I GOTCHU. Sit down, buckle up, and get ready to get PUMPED on CMMC. 

Let’s start with what it is, right? 

That seems like a good place to start. CMMC is the Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification. Katie Arrington calls it The CMMC. The rest of us just call it CMMC. CMMC has a pretty bitchin mission statement: 

  1. Safeguard sensitive information to enable and protect the warfighter 
  1. Enforce DIB cybersecurity standards to meet evolving threats 
  1. Ensure accountability while minimizing barriers to compliance with DoD requirements 
  1. Perpetuate a collaborative culture of cybersecurity and cyber resilience 
  1. Maintain public trust through high professional and ethical standards 

(Heads up we love an acronym around here. I’ll stick a reference down at the bottom. For now, know that DIB = Defense Industrial Base) 

Now we do timeline! This baby has been 15 years in the making. 

2010, November:  Once upon a time, President Obama was like “I’m sick of all these different markings for our information. FOUO? How about GTFO? We’re standardizing and calling all controlled unclassified information exactly that. We can shorten it to CUI. People will love this.” Executive Order 13556 — Controlled Unclassified Information | whitehouse.gov 

2015, June:  NIST says something like “ok we’ve had the CUI marker for a while now. But how do we protect it? Where are the standards?” It was a good question, and luckily, NIST is the institute that can help with stuff like that. They release NIST SP 800-171: “Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information in Nonfederal Systems and Organizations”. Note that this is specific to Industry, since our Fed homies are already aligned to NIST 800-53. NIST SP 800-171 is a derivative of that publication, comprised of 110 security requirements. We’ll get into version history, assessment objectives, and class deviations a bit later. SP 800-171 Rev. 2, Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information in Nonfederal Systems and Organizations | CSRC 

2016, October:  The DoD takes things into their own hands. No one is enforcing the protection of CUI, and national security is at stake. We MUST ask the defense supply chain to shore up cybersecurity. DFARS clause 252.204-7012 goes into the FAR. This clause starts hitting contracts the DoD is sending out, and says “We’re giving you CUI. You’re creating CUI. You had better be protecting that CUI by implementing the 110 security requirements in NIST SP 800-171. You have until December 31st, 2017 to be 100% in compliance. P.S. if you have a cyber incident, you have to tell us within 72 hours AND you have to flow down this requirement to any of your subcontractors that are going to be storing, processing, or transmitting CUI”. 252.204-7012 Safeguarding Covered Defense Information and Cyber Incident Reporting. | Acquisition.GOV 

2017 – 2019:  DIB contractors did not do the thing that they very explicitly said they were doing. 

2019, July:  The DoD’s Office of Inspector General releases a report after an audit of DIB adherence to NIST 800-171. Their findings? It ain’t happening. Turns out self-attestation isn’t a great way to get organizations into compliance. The results are pretty damning, and pretty frustrating for folks that care about safeguarding our national interests. Audit of Protection of DoD Controlled Unclassified Information on Contractor-Owned Networks and Systems DODIG-2019-105 > Department of Defense > DoD OIG Reports 

2020, January:  CMMC 1.0 is released. It’s not being enforced, but the model now exists and this is cool. Again, only going to be applicable to DIB, but it is a START at keeping our stuff safe from foreign adversaries. There are five levels, it’s not super well defined, it’s definitely too complex, but again – it’s a start. This is v cool. Things are supposed to go rapidly and we think we’re going to see CMMC requirements in contracts by like, the end of 2020. 

2020, March:  you remember. This kind of derails… gestures broadly at everything 

2020, June:  Pilot program begins. Gradual implementation, DoD is ready and willing to work with Industry to make this happen. 

2021, March:  Industry feedback comes in. “This is expensive. This is complex. This is time consuming.” DoD graciously takes this into consideration (and I do legit mean graciously, since contractors are currently complaining about something that they have said they were doing for three entire years now). 

2021, November:  CMMC 2.0 is here! Kinda. Like the program gets unveiled (now with three levels and much more clarity) but it’s still not in the federal register. DoD and Industry collab on program implementation, develop a phased roll out, all the good stuff that’s needed to turn this into a working model for us all. 

2024, December:  OK NOW IT’S REALLY ACTUALLY HERE. Kinda. CFR Title 32 part 170 goes into effect, firmly establishing the CMMC program. It’s official, it’s real, it’s in the federal register. This is VERY exciting. Much hubbub ensues. There is now a real, defined framework and program for ensuring Industry compliance with NIST 800-171. BUT WAIT. There are two rules in play, and 32 is only one of them. It establishes the program, it does not incorporate CMMC into contracts. Federal Register :: Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification (CMMC) Program 

2025, November:  OK THIS TIME I MEAN IT, IT IS HERE LFG. CFR Title 48 parts 204, 212, 217, and 252 enter the federal register on the Marine Corps’ 250th birthday. This is it, this is the Final Rule that means CMMC is beginning its phased roll out and there ain’t no turnin back now. This rule amends the DFARS to incorporate contractual requirements for DoD contractors. So what Industry sees in their contracts is DFARS clause 252.204-7021. What makes that possible is the publication of Title 48 in the federal register. 252.204-7021 Contractor Compliance With the Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification Level Requirements. | Acquisition.GOV and Federal Register :: Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement: Assessing Contractor Implementation of Cybersecurity Requirements (DFARS Case 2019-D041) 

July 13, 2026:  lol jk, self-assessment is fine again. Forging the Arsenal of Freedom: Department of War Suspends CMMC Phase II Requirements > U.S. Department of War > Release | U.S. Department of War 

Reference Docs 

I spend a lot of time going back to what other folks have written. I’ve got these all bookmarked, but to save you the trouble, I thought I’d go ahead and make ya a little URL library for what I’ve got saved and why. 

Part One: Source Documentation 

This is stuff that’s been put out by Fed or the CyberAB (performing a no-cost contract with the DoD to oversee the CMMC program). When it comes down to “truth”, this is where we go. Everything else comes from experience, opinion, and speculation. FWIW, the only CyberAB doc is the CAP. Everything else (including scoping and assessment guides) comes straight from DoD. 

Rules, regulations, and publications 

  1. 32 CFR (part 170, the part about CMMC): eCFR :: 32 CFR Part 170 — Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification (CMMC) Program 
  1. Why this matters: It’s literally THE rule. 
  1. Like 48 matters too (bc that’s where it says “you gotta put this in contracts”), but 32 gives the nitty gritty on how the program is meant to work, who the players are in the program, and what it takes to pass assessment. We also refer to “32 CFR” a lot, but the thing we actually care about is “32 CFR part 170”. We don’t need to refer to part 170 every time we discuss, but it’s important that we keep it in the back of our heads. 
  1. 32 CFR (part 2002, the part about CUI): eCFR :: 32 CFR Part 2002 — Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) 
  1. You want the definitions for CUI, CUI Specified, and CUI Basic? This is where you go. This is the actual establishment of the Executive CUI program. 
  1. 48 CFR: Federal Register :: Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement: Assessing Contractor Implementation of Cybersecurity Requirements (DFARS Case 2019-D041) 
  1. Why this matters: This baby puts the whole dang thing into effect. Contractors don’t care about 48 CFR, they care about the fact that 48 CFR put DFARS 7021 into place. 
  1. DFARS 7012: 252.204-7012 Safeguarding Covered Defense Information and Cyber Incident Reporting. | Acquisition.GOV 
  1. Why this matters: Contractors already see this in their contracts with DoD and Primes. You know the False Claims Act? It comes up when Industry does NOT meet the security requirements in NIST 800-171. Again, Industry has been told to be compliant with NIST 800-171 since DECEMBER 31st of FREAKING 2017. Yeah, if you get slapped with a False Claims Act, it sucks, but it shouldn’t be unexpected. 
  1. DFARS 7021: 252.204-7021 Contractor Compliance With the Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification Level Requirements. | Acquisition.GOV 
  1. Why this matters: Ta-da! CMMC requirements are IN contracts, and you must meet compliance at the time of contract award. 

Scoping and assessment 

  1. CMMC Scoping Guide for Level 2: CMMC Scoping Guide Level 2 
  1. Why this matters: When you’re establishing boundaries, this is your bible. You want to keep your CMMC scope as small as possible, and this doc will help you do that. 
  1. CMMC Assessment Guide for Level 2: CMMC Assessment Guide Level 2 
  1. Why this matters: As you prep for either self-assessment or assessment by a C3PAO, you want to be damn sure that you’ve crossed your Ts and dotted your Is. This is THE thing that will help. Heads up that there are scoping guides and assessment guides for Levels 1 and 3 as well, but since we deal mostly with folks looking to get Level 2, that’s what I’m sticking in here. 
  1. CMMC Assessment Process (CAP): CMMC Assessment Process v2.0.pdf 
  1. Why this matters: This is a huge piece of what CCPs and CCAs get grilled on when taking their tests. This is what your clients want to know as they get ready to go into Assessment. 

Memos and class deviations 

  1. Determining CMMC level: Implementing the Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification Program: Guidance for Determining Appropriate CMMC Compliance Assessment Levels and Process for Waiving CMMC Assessment Requirements 
  1. Listen, it’s ok to not just accept markings or determinations. It’s ok to ask questions. You can save yourself and your subcontractors a lot of headaches if you make sure that what you’re getting is appropriately marked. 
  1. ODPs for Rev 3: Department of Defense Organization-Defined Parameters for National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-171 Revision 3 
  1. We’re not on NIST SP 800-171 rev 3 yet (we’re still working off of rev 2). BUT it’s def coming, probably in the next year and a half or so. Preparing now just makes sense. An ODP is an Organizationally Defined Parameter, and in our case, the “organization” is DoD. They get to say (for example) what kind of audit logs we need to keep. This memo highlights alla that. 
  1. Sticking with NIST 800-171 R2: MEMORANDUM FOR 
  1. Speaking of R2, there was confusion there for a while if we should be on R2 or R3. This class deviation clears it up for us. 

Additional resources 

  1. NARA CUI Registry: CUI Registry | National Archives 
  1. Yeah, DoD has their own registry. But NARA’s is the official, real, legit, one. The Organizational Index Groupings that we pay attention to are Defense and Export Control. 
  1. CMMC FAQs: CYBERSECURITY MATURITY MODEL CERTIFICATION Program FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 
  1. When DoD puts out a list of FAQs, mind their answers. 
  1. PPT from DoD on technical application: Topics For CIO Summit: External Service Providers (ESPs), Asset Categories, SPA/SPD, and VDI 
  1. This is helpful if (when) you want to get deep into asset types and applicability for security requirements. It’s also got some info on VDI that’s gonna be nice to have on hand. 
  1. DoDI 5200.48: DoDI 5200.48, “Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI),” Effective March 6, 2020 
  1. Obama’s EO said “make me a CUI program”. 32 CFR 2002 said “cool, here’s your CUI program”. DoDI 5200.48 said “nice, here’s instruction for DoD on how to adopt the CUI program”. 

Part Deux: Reference Material 

So like YES always go back to our source material, BUT there are a whole lot of really smart people out there (Amira Armond is a personal hero of mine, for example). Below are some of my go-tos. 

  1. This blog from Richard Wakeman: Understanding Compliance Between Commercial, Government, DoD & Secret Offerings – July 2025 Update | Microsoft Community Hub 
  1. It’s an intense read, but it is the best thing I’ve found to talk customers through “do I need GCC or GCC High”. 
  1. Reference architectures for DIB: Microsoft-Reference-Identity-Architectures-ND-ISAC-MSCloud-Whitepaper.pdf 
  1. Comes complete with pretty pictures so we don’t have to start from scratch! 
  1. Speaking of reference architectures: KRA-Datasheet.pdf 
  1. Have I mentioned my love for Amira Armond? I stand by it.  She is a brilliant OG and everyone should listen to her. The KRA is WILDLY helpful in that it’s designed around GCC High. Use this for scoping. 
  1. Technical reference guide from Microsoft: Download Microsoft Technical Reference Guide for CMMC 2.0 from Official Microsoft Download Center 
  1. It’s a doozy, but where NIST 800-171 says “achieve this”, this doc says “and here’s how”. 

Part Trois: Catch-Alls 

Helpful catch-alls. Like bookmark these and know these and love these. 

  1. CMMC Wiki: CMMC Toolkit Wiki 
  1. Has everything. I mean EVERYTHING. I mostly use this for CCP exam practice. 
  1. DoD CUI Program: DoD CUI Program 

OKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKK I am le tired and legit, you need to go read this source documentation. Let’s consider this a work in progress? 

Notes to self on stuff I still wanna tell you about: NARA and ISOO. CyberAB and CAICO. CMMC L1 vs L2. Ethics for the ecosystem. Tailoring for 171 from 53. Hashing guidance for assessment evidence. Specialized assets. 

THERE’S SO DANG MUCH but again…